Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game
AbstractThis paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the prior, and the data, with preferences represented by the likelihood.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/81.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-16 (All new papers)
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