This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Is Policy Ownership An Operational Concept?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
James M. Boughton
Alex Mourmouras
Abstract

IMF lending is generally conditional on specified policies and outcomes. These conditions usually are negotiated compromises between policies initially favored by the Fund and by the country's authorities. In some cases the authorities might be satisfied enough with the outcome to take responsibility for it ("own" it) even though it was not their original preference. In other cases, they might accept the outcome only to obtain financing, in which case weak commitment might lead to poor implementation. This paper reviews the theoretical basis for the importance of ownership, summarizes what is known about its empirical effects, and suggests a strategy for strengthening it.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0272.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/72.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 09 May 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/72

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Conditionality ; Fund ; Economic models ;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mohsin S. Khan & Sunil Sharma, 2001. "IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs," IMF Working Papers 01/142, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 894-917, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Craig Burnside & David Dollar, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Krusell, Per & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1996. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 301-29, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Thomas D. Willett, 2000. "A Soft-Core Public Choice Analysis of the International Monetary Fund," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-56, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 2000. "Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C62-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. A. Dalmazzo & Guido De Blasio, 2001. "Resources and Incentives to Reform: A Model and Some Evidence on Sub-Saharan African Countries," IMF Working Papers 01/86, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  11. Benjamin R. Bridgman & Igor D. Livshits & James C. MacGee, 2004. "For Sale: Barriers to Riches," University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20043, University of Western Ontario, RBC Financial Group Economic Policy Research Institute. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, 2002. "Barriers to Riches," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661306.
  13. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Wolfgang Mayer & Alex Mourmouras, 2002. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 02/73, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Adam, Christopher S. & O'Connell, Stephen A., 1998. "Aid, taxation, and development: analytical perspectives on aid effectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1885, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wolfgang Mayer & Anna Ivanova & George C. Anayotos & Alex Mourmouras, 2003. "What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?," IMF Working Papers 03/8, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rodney Ramcharan, 2004. "Debt “Hold Up†and International Lending," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 462, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rodney Ramcharan, 2004. "Debt Hold Up and International Lending," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 341, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rodney Ramcharan, 2003. "Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 03/192, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Carsten Hefeker & Katharina Michaelowa, 2005. "Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 159-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rodney Ramcharan, 2002. "How Does Conditional Aid (Not) Work?," IMF Working Papers 02/183, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hefeker, Carsten, 2005. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 19, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Peter Isard & Allan Drazen, 2004. "Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?," IMF Working Papers 04/163, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Allan Drazen & Peter Isard, 2004. "Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?," NBER Working Papers 10927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Mariarosaria Agostino, 2004. "Conditionality, Commitment and Investment Response in LDCs," Economics Working Papers 2004-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.