Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Primer on Reforms in a Second-Best Ambiguous Environment: A Case for Gradualism

Contents:

Author Info

  • S. Nuri Erbas
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Ambiguity, as opposed to uncertainty, reflects lack of sufficient information about distribution and payoffs of infrequent events. Reforms are infrequent events, undertaken in ambiguous second-best environments where bad reform outcomes are feasible. A general case for the gradualist reform strategy is that it may pay to defer some reforms until relevant information about possible reform outcomes and associated probabilities is revealed, and ambiguity is reduced over time. Gradualism may dominate the big bang strategy, if some of the reforms in a reform sequence are not sure bets and waiting costs do not dominate reversal costs under some information sets forthcoming over time. The relation to Ellsberg's Paradox is discussed. Some cases for and against gradualism are reviewed.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=15681
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/50.

    as in new window
    Length: 56
    Date of creation: 01 Mar 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/50

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
    Phone: (202) 623-7000
    Fax: (202) 623-4661
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. repec:imf:imfpdp:9306 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Blanchard, Olivier J., 1985. "Credibility, disinflation and gradualism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 211-217.
    3. Cesar Martinelli & Mariano Tommasi, 1993. "Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints," UCLA Economics Working Papers 701, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Mariano Tommasi & Andres Velasco, 1996. "Where are we in the political economy of reform?," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 187-238.
    5. Aasim M. Husain & Ratna Sahay, 1992. "Does Sequencing of Privatization Matter in Reforming Planned Economies," IMF Working Papers 92/13, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
    7. Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, 1999. "Uncertainty and the Design of Long-Run Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 7036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1992. "The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilizations," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 439-58, September.
    9. Mathias Dewatripont & Gérard Roland, 1995. "The design of reform packages under uncertainty," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9607, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    10. Kreps, David M & Porteus, Evan L, 1978. "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 185-200, January.
    11. Jones, Robert A & Ostroy, Joseph M, 1984. "Flexibility and Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 13-32, January.
    12. repec:imf:imfpdp:9426 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Leonardo Auernheimer & Susan Mary George, 1997. "Shock Versus Gradualism in Models of Rational Expectations: The Case of Trade Liberalization," IMF Working Papers 97/122, International Monetary Fund.
    14. repec:imf:imfwpa:99/159 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Einhorn, Hillel J & Hogarth, Robin M, 1986. "Decision Making under Ambiguity," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S225-50, October.
    16. Uzi Segal, 1985. "The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers 362, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
    18. Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1987. "The Politics of Ambiguity," NBER Working Papers 2468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Weil, Philippe, 1990. "Nonexpected Utility in Macroeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 29-42, February.
    20. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
    21. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. " Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-70, October.
    22. Henry, Claude, 1974. "Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty: The "Irreversibility Effect."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1006-12, December.
    23. P. Lian & S.-J. Wei, 1998. "To Shock or Not to Shock? Economics and Political Economy of Large-Scale Reforms," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 161-183, 07.
    24. Schoemaker, Paul J H, 1982. "The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 529-63, June.
    25. Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "The Positive Economics of Policy Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 356-61, May.
    26. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1993. "Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-49, February.
    27. Loomes, Graham & Sugden, Robert, 1986. "Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 271-82, April.
    28. Epstein Larry G. & Le Breton Michel, 1993. "Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-22, October.
    29. Aasim M. Husain & Ratna Sahay, 1992. "Does Sequencing of Privatization Matter in Reforming Planned Economies?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(4), pages 801-824, December.
    30. Robin M. Hogarth & Hillel J. Einhorn, 1990. "Venture Theory: A Model of Decision Weights," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(7), pages 780-803, July.
    31. Kahn, Barbara E & Sarin, Rakesh K, 1988. " Modeling Ambiguity in Decisions under Uncertainty," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 265-72, September.
    32. Kunreuther, Howard & Meszaros, Jacqueline & Hogarth, Robin M. & Spranca, Mark, 1995. "Ambiguity and underwriter decision processes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 337-352, May.
    33. Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. S. Nuri Erbas, 2003. "IMF Conditionality and Program Ownership: A Case for Streamlined Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 03/98, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ashoka Mody & Abdul Abiad, 2005. "Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?," IMF Economic Issues 35, International Monetary Fund.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.