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Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Marc Quintyn
Michael Taylor
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Despite its importance, the issue of financial sector regulatory and supervisory independence (RSI) has received only marginal attention in literature and practice. However, experience has demonstrated that improper supervisory arrangements have contributed significantly to the deepening of several recent systemic banking crises. In this paper we argue that RSI is important for financial stability for the same reasons that central bank independence is important for monetary stability. The paper lays out four key dimensions of RSI-regulatory, supervisory, institutional and budgetary-and discusses ways to achieve them. We also discuss institutional arrangements needed to make independence work in practice. The key issue in this respect is that agency independence and accountability need to go hand in hand. The paper discusses a number of accountability arrangements.
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number
02/46.
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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 27 Mar 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/46Contact details of provider: Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA Phone: (202) 623-7000 Fax: (202) 623-4661 Email: Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm More information through EDIRC
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For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Bank regulations ; Bank supervision ; Central bank legislation ; Financial stability ; Other versions of this item:
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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Jakob Haan & Sander Oosterloo, 2006.
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"Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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"Who pays for banking supervision? Principles and practices ,"
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"Integrated Financial Supervision: an Institutional Perspective for the Philippines ,"
Discussion Papers
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Eva H. G. Hupkes & Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2005.
"The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice ,"
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H. Brouwer & R. de Haas & B. Kiviet, 2002.
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MEB Series (discontinued)
2002-6, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
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Donato Masciandaro & María J. Nieto & Henriëtte Prast, 2007.
"Financial governance of banking supervision ,"
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Lucía Cuadro Sáez & Sonsoles Gallego Herrero & Alicia García Herrero, 2003.
"Why Do Countries Develop More Financially Than Others? The Role Of The Central Bank And Banking Supervision ,"
Finance
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"Regulatory choices in global financial markets – restoring the role of aggregate utility in the shaping of market supervision ,"
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Discussion Papers
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Fotios Pasiouras & Chrysovalantis Gaganis & Constantin Zopounidis, 2006.
"The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis ,"
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting ,
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"Assessing the Preconditions in Establishing an Independent Regulatory and Supervisory Agency in Globalized Financial Markets: The Case of Turkey ,"
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"Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance ,"
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Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis, 2009.
"On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy ,"
MPRA Paper
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Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn & MarÃa Nieto, 2009.
"Will they Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the new European System of Financial Supervisors ,"
IMF Working Papers
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"Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - a Stocktaking Exercise ,"
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SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2007/4 edited by Morten Balling, October.
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Donato Masciandaro, 2006.
"E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants ,"
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Henk Brouwer & Ralph de Haas & Bas Kiviet, 2002.
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Macroeconomics
0209003, EconWPA.
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Jean-Francois Segalotto & Martin Sommer & Marco Arnone & Bernard Laurens, 2007.
"Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends ,"
IMF Working Papers
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