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Optimal Central Bank Conservatism and Monopoly Trade Unions

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Author Info
Helge Berger
Carsten Hefeker
Ronnie Schlöb

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Abstract

The "conservative central banker" has come under attack recently. On the basis of models in which there is explicit interaction between trade union behavior and monetary policy, it has been argued that if 'trade unions' are averse to inflation, welfare will be lower with a conservative than with a liberal central bank. We reframe this discussion in a standard trade union model. We show that the case against the conservative central banker rests exclusively on the assumption of a strictly nominal outside option (for instance, unemployment benefits) for the union. There is no welfare gain associated with making the central bank less conservative than society, however, if the outside option is in real terms. As the nominal components of the trade union's outside option are mainly public transfers, we also show that the conservative central banker is always optimal if the government can choose the level of nominal unemployment benefits as well as the degree of central bank conservatism.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/44.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 26 Mar 2002
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/44

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Related research
Keywords: Central banks ; Monetary policy ; Labor market policy ; Economic models ;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Lawrence Katz, 1999. "Wage Dynamics: Reconciling Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6924, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non Atomistic Wage Setters," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1354, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Lawler, Phillip, 2000. "Centralised Wage Setting, Inflation Contracts, and the Optimal Choice of Central Banker," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 559-75, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cubitt, Robin P, 1992. "Monetary Policy Games and Private Sector Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 513-30, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fischer, Stanley & Summers, Lawrence, 1993. "Should Governments Learn to Live with Inflation? Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 312-13, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Henrik Jensen, 1993. "International monetary policy cooperation in economies with centralized wage setting," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 269-285, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Gruner, Hans Peter & Hefeker, Carsten, 1999. " How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 101(1), pages 33-47, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Cukierman, Alex & Dalmazzo, Alberto, 2000. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labour Markets And Economic Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2407, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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  16. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. David Soskice & Torben Iversen, 2000. "The Nonneutrality Of Monetary Policy With Large Price Or Wage Setters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 265-284, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," CEPR Discussion Papers 2306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Athanasios TAGKALAKIS, 2002. "Labor Market Reform and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union," Economics Working Papers ECO2002/28, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tilemahos Efthimiadis, 2004. "Does Wage Indexing Matter?," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 30, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hans Peter Grüner & Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2005. "Unions, wage setting and monetary policy uncertainty," Working Paper Series 490, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert Franzese, 2001. "Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 457-486, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. James McHugh, 2002. "Wage Centralization, Union Bargaining, and Macroeconomic Performance," IMF Working Papers 02/143, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  7. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2007. "The Cost of Social Pacts," MPRA Paper 3585, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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