1. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Ciccone, Antonio & Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1996. "Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 33-59, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Ciccone & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1993. "Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 83, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Ciccone & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1995. "Start-up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as Barriers to Economic Development," Economics Working Papers 142, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
   • Antonio Ciccone & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1992. "Start-up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as Barriers to Economic Development," Discussion Papers 1031, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Antonio Ciccone & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1993. "Start-Up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as Barriers to Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 4363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Cissone, A. & Matsuyama, K., 1992. "Start-Up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as Barriers to Economic Development," Papers e-92-14, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
   • Ciccone, A. & Matsuyama, K., 1993. "Start-Up Costs and Pecuniary Externalities as Barriers to Economic Development," Papers 533, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
3. Huang, Peter H & Wu, Ho-Mou, 1994. "More Order without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 390-406, October.
4. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1996. "Why Are There Rich and Poor Countries? Symmetry-Breaking in the World Economy," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 419-439, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kiminori Matsuyama, 1996. "Why Are There Rich and Poor Countries?: Symmetry-Breaking in the World Economy," NBER Working Papers 5697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S103-26, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," NBER Working Papers 2588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Barro, R.J., 1988. "Government Spending In A Simple Model Of Endogenous Growth," RCER Working Papers 130, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
6. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Skaperdas, S., 1991. "Cooperation, Conflict And Power In The Absence Of Property Rights," Papers 90-91-06a, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
8. Tirole, Jean, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • TIROLE, Jean, 1994. ""A Theory of Collective Reputations" with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," IDEI Working Papers 38, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   • Tirole, J., 1993. "A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality," Working papers 93-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Bouwe Dijkstra, . "Good And Bad Equilibria With The Informal Sector," Discussion Papers 06/01, University of Nottingham, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2006. "Cultures of Corruption: Evidence From Diplomatic Parking Tickets," NBER Working Papers 12312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2007. "Rent-seeking competition from state coffers in a calibrated DSGE model of the euro area," Working Papers 2007_29, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. [Downloadable!]
4. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides, 2005. "Rent Seeking, Policy and Growth under Electoral Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence," DEGIT Conference Papers c010_029, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade. [Downloadable!]
5. Djumashev, R, 2007. "Corruption, uncertainty and growth," MPRA Paper 3716, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
6. Paulo Melo-Filho, 2008. "Essays on Political Economy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002254, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2005. "The Role of Government in Anti-Social Redistributive Activities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
8. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides, . "Fiscal Policy, Rent Seeking and Growth under Electoral Uncertainty Theory and Evidence from the OECD," Working Papers 2007_28, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
9. George Economides & Sarantis Kalyvitis & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2004. "Do Foreign Aid Transfers Distort Incentives and Hurt Growth? Theory and Evidence from 75 Aid-recipient Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
10. Djumashev, Ratbek, 2006. "Corrupt Bureaucracy and Growth," MPRA Paper 2082, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
11. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2006. "Rent-Seeking Competition from State Coffers: A Calibrated DSGE Model of the Euro Area," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
12. Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vangelis Vassilatos, 2003. "On the Optimal Size of Public Sector under Rent-Seeking competition from State Coffers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
13. Kaufmann, Daniel & Bellver, Ana, 2005. "Transparenting Transparency: Intial Empirics and Policy Applications," MPRA Paper 8188, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]