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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/137.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 04 Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/137

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Keywords: Central banks ; Transparency ; Central bank policy ; Economic models ;

References listed on IDEAS
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1. Peter Stella, 1997. "Do Central Banks Need Capital?," IMF Working Papers 97/83, International Monetary Fund.
2. Stanley Fischer, 2001. "Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 3-24, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Giovannini, Alberto & de Melo, Martha, 1993. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 953-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. G. A. Mackenzie & Peter Stella, 1996. "Quasi-Fiscal Operations of Public Financial Institutions," IMF Occasional Papers 142, International Monetary Fund.
7. George Kopits, 2001. "Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?," IMF Working Papers 01/145, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
8. Mario I. Bléjer & Liliana Schumacher, 1998. "Central Bank Vulnerability and the Credibility of Commitments - A Value-at-Risk Approach to Currency Crises," IMF Working Papers 98/65, International Monetary Fund.
9. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. [Downloadable!]
10. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies : an international perspective," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Rerform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - an International Perspective," Papers 00-19, Tel Aviv.
    • Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey & Neyapti, Bilin, 2001. "Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 2808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central Bank Rerform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - an International Perspective," Papers 2000-19, Tel Aviv.
11. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," NBER Working Papers 7161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. William E. Alexander & Charles Enoch & Tomás J. T. Baliño, 1995. "The Adoption of Indirect Instruments of Monetary Policy," IMF Occasional Papers 126, International Monetary Fund.
13. Maxwell J. Fry, 1993. "The Fiscal Abuse of Central Banks," IMF Working Papers 93/58, International Monetary Fund.
14. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2000. "Good, Bad or Ugly? On The Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting," IMF Working Papers 00/172, International Monetary Fund.
    Other versions:
    • Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2001. "Good, Bad or Ugly? On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative Accounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2663, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2004. "Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 377-394, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Kenneth Sullivan, . "Transparency in Central Bank Financial Statement Disclosures," IMF Working Papers 00/186, International Monetary Fund.
16. Daniel Gros & Franziska Schobert, 1999. "Excess foreign exchange reserves and overcapitalisation in the Eurosystem," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 52(19), pages 25-35, October.
17. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 211-21, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.