Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001
Abstract
This paper describes the evolution of ideas to apply bankruptcy reorganization principles to sovereign debt crises. Our focus is on policy proposals between the late 1970s and Anne Krueger's (2001) proposed 'Sovereign Debt-Restructuring Mechanism,' with brief reference to the economics literature on sovereign debt. We describe the perceived inefficiencies that motivate proposals, and how proposals seek to change debtor and creditor incentives. We find that there has been a moving concensus on what constitutes the underlying problem, but not on how to fix it. The range of proposed approaches remains broad and only recently shows some signs of narrowing.Download Info
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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 02/133.Length: 42
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/133
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 8.
- B29 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Other
- B30 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - General
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
References
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- Krugman, Paul, 1988.
"Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 253-268, November.
- Paul R. Krugman, 1989. "Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang," NBER Working Papers 2486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Notas sueltas sobre el rescate de España
by Cives in Politikon on 2012-06-09 20:43:49
Cited by:
- Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2010.
"International Government Debt,"
UNCTAD Discussion Papers
199, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2010. "International Government Debt," Business School Working Papers 2010-03, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Jose Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004.
"Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets,"
2004 Meeting Papers
7, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 47-72, September.
- José Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 153, Econometric Society.
- Federico Weinschelbaum & Jose Wynne, 2004. "Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets," Working Papers 75, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Aug 2004.
- De Paoli, Bianca & Hoggarth, Glenn & Saporta, Victoria, 2009. "Output costs of sovereign crises: some empirical estimates," Bank of England working papers 362, Bank of England.
- Ugo Panizza, 2013. "Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion," IHEID Working Papers 03-2013, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
- Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, 2013.
"You Never Give Me Your Money? Sovereign Debt Crises, Collective Action Problems, and IMF Lending,"
IMF Working Papers
13/20, International Monetary Fund.
- Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, 2013. "You never give me your money? Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 143, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2010.
"Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment,"
NBER Working Papers
16632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.
- Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2008. "Holdouts In Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory Of Negotiation In A Weak Contractual Environment," CAMA Working Papers 2008-37, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Prokop, Jacek, 2012. "Bargaining over debt rescheduling," MPRA Paper 44315, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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