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Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks

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Author Info

  • George G. Kaufman
  • Steven A. Seelig
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    Abstract

    Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors'' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While the sources and implications of losses at resolution have been analyzed previously, the sources and implications of losses after resolution have received little attention. This paper examines the causes of delayed depositors'' access to their funds at resolved banks, describes how the FDIC provides immediate access, reports on a special survey of access practices in other countries, and analyzes the costs and benefits of delayed access in terms of both the effects on market discipline and depositor pressure to protect all deposits.

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    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=15139
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/83.

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    Length: 23
    Date of creation: 01 Jun 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/83

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    Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
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    Related research

    Keywords: Deposit insurance; bank failures; present value; bank failure; insolvent banks; systemic risk; banking; banking crises; bank assets; federal regulatory forbearance; deposit insurance scheme; banking crisis; bank liquidation; bank regulation; contagion; bank liabilities; national bank; preventing banking crises; bank stakeholders; bank stability; banking systems; maturity value; deposit guarantee; bank holding; money center bank; failure resolution; deposit protection; deposit guarantee schemes; financial safety net; financial crisis; bank insolvencies; bank holding companies; bank examiners;

    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Demirguc-Kunt, Asl1 & Huizinga, Harry, 1999. "Market discipline and financial safety net design," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2183, The World Bank.
    2. George G. Kaufman, 1990. "Are Some Banks Too Large To Fail? Myth And Reality," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(4), pages 1-14, October.
    3. Kane, Edward J, 1990. " Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-64, July.
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    Cited by:
    1. Eric Santor, 2003. "Banking Crises and Contagion: Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 03-1, Bank of Canada.

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