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The International Lender of Last Resort

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  • Olivier Jeanne

Abstract

This paper considers how an international lender of last resort (LOLR) can prevent self-fulfilling banking and currency crises in emerging economies. We compare two different arrangements: one in which the international LOLR injects liquidity into international financial markets, and one in which its resources are used to back domestic banking safety nets. Both arrangements would require important changes in the global financial architecture: the first one would require a global central bank issuing an international currency, while the second one would have to be operated by an "international banking fund" closely involved in the supervision of domestic banking systems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/76.

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Length: 37
Date of creation: 01 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/76

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Keywords: Dollarization; exchange rate; banking; foreign exchange; bank runs; banking sector; exchange reserves; foreign exchange reserves; bank assets; exchange rate regimes; foreign exchange market; banks ? solvency; currency depreciation; exchange rates; exchange rate flexibility; exchange rate regime; banking sectors; banking system; banks ? balance sheets; banks ? assets; exchange rate expectations; banking supervision; banking systems; banking policy; bank run; fixed exchange rate; currency risk; banking crises; segmentation; flexible exchange rate; banks ? liabilities; bank deposits; bank closures; present value; bank policy; exchange rate stability; deposit insurance; floating exchange rate; banking collapse; national bank; exchange risk; currency pegs; exchange rate uncertainty; banking supervisors; banking panics; banking panic; debt restructuring; bank of international settlements; floating exchange rate regime; bank failures; banking assets; banker; banking crisis; flexible exchange rate regime; bank crisis; exchange rate depreciation; bank regulation; central banking; hard currency; banks ? balance sheet; exchange rate developments; fixed exchange rate regimes;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2006. "Catalytic finance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 161-177, September.
  2. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Goderis, Benedikt, 2007. "The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates During Currency Crises: The Role of Debt, Institutions and Financial Openness," CEPR Discussion Papers 6217, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Jeanne, Olivier & Ostry, Jonathan D & Zettelmeyer, Jeronimo, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Roland Beck & Sebastian Weber, 2011. "Should Larger Reserve Holdings Be More Diversified?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 415-444, December.
  5. Chami, Ralph & Sharma, Sunil & Shim, Ilhyock, 2007. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-26, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  6. Germana Corrado, 2005. "Liquidity Shocks, Banking System Failures, and Supranational Lending of Last Resort Facilities," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 1-24, May.
  7. Takuji Kinkyo, 2004. "Transmission channels of capital flow shocks: why Korean crisis was so severe," Working Papers 139, Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, UK.
  8. Weithoner, Thomas, 2006. "How can IMF policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1257-1276, December.
  9. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Olivier Jeanne, 2002. "Original Sin, Balance Sheet Crises, and the Roles of International Lending," IMF Working Papers 02/234, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Adalbert Winkler, 2010. "The Financial Crisis: A Wake-Up Call for Strengthening Regional Monitoring of Financial Markets and Regional Coordination of Financial Sector Policies?," Working Papers id:3021, eSocialSciences.
  11. Sergio Masciantonio, 2005. "The Role of Preference Structure and Moral Hazard in a Multiple Equilibria. Model of Financial Crises," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(6), pages 135-165, November-.
  12. Tobias Knedlik & Johannes Ströbel, 2006. "The role of banking portfolios in the transmission from currency crises to banking crises - potential effects of Basel II," IWH Discussion Papers 21, Halle Institute for Economic Research.

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