Competition Among Regulators
AbstractThis paper shows that competition among regulators reduces regulatory standards relative to a centralized solution. It suggests that a central regulator is more likely to emerge for homogeneous and financially integrated countries. The paper proves these results in a model where regulators concerned with their banking system’s stability and efficiency and with their banks’ profitability set their regulatory policy non-cooperatively. Externalities in bank regulation make the independent solution collectively inefficient. These externalities and the benefits of centralized regulation increase with financial integration, while the costs associated with the loss of independence decrease with the homogeneity of the countries involved.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/73.
Date of creation: 01 May 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- D'Hulster, Katia, 2011. "Cross border banking supervision : incentive conflicts in supervisory information sharing between home and host supervisors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5871, The World Bank.
- Holger Wolf, 2008. "Rethinking banking supervision in the EU," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 357-361, February.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005.
"Cooperation in International Banking Supervision,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2004. "Cooperation in international banking supervision," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0316, European Central Bank.
- International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 06/34, International Monetary Fund.
- Viral V. Acharya, 2003.
"Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association,
American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
- Acharya, Viral V, 2002. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Martin CihÃ¡k & JÃ¶rg Decressin, 2007. "The Case for a European Banking Charter," IMF Working Papers 07/173, International Monetary Fund.
- Hardy, Daniel C. & Nieto, Maria J., 2011. "Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 155-164, August.
- International Monetary Fund, 2008. "Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees," IMF Working Papers 08/283, International Monetary Fund.
- Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- International Monetary Fund, 2009. "A European Mandate for Financial Sector Supervisors in the EU," IMF Working Papers 09/5, International Monetary Fund.
- Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Kaufman, George G., 2008. "Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 168-204, September.
- Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum fÃ¼r EuropÃ¤ische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Daniel C. Hardy & María J. Nieto, 2011. "Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision And deposit guarantees," Banco de Espaï¿½a Working Papers 1126, Banco de Espa�a.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.