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What is Different About Family Businesses?

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Author Info

  • Ralph Chami

Abstract

Family businesses make up forty percent of the Fortune 500 companies in the US, generate about two-thirds of the German GDP, employ about one-half of the labor force in Britain, and account for the majority of the private economies in developing countries. This paper develops a theory of family business that brings market forces and the family, as a nonmarket institution, under one rubric. The paper highlights and analyzes important factors, including product market competition, trust, and succession, which allow family businesses to thrive and to successfully compete with other businesses.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/70.

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Length: 37
Date of creation: 01 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/70

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Dynastic Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 971-996, 01.
  2. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2005. "Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies: Evidence from India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2005-007, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  3. Ampenberger, Markus & Schmid, Thomas & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin & Kaserer, Christoph, 2009. "Capital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economy," CEFS Working Paper Series 2009-05, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS), Technische Universität München.
  4. Schmid, Thomas & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2010. "Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-01, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS), Technische Universität München.
  5. Ralph Chami & Sunil Sharma & Connel Fullenkamp, 2009. "A Framework for Financial Market Development," IMF Working Papers 09/156, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Chami, Ralph & Cosimano, Thomas F. & Fullenkamp, Connel, 2002. "Managing ethical risk: How investing in ethics adds value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1697-1718, September.
  7. Bennedsen, Morten & Nielsen, Kasper & Pérez-González, Francisco & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2005. "Inside the Family Firm," Working Papers 21-2005, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  8. Jordi Brandts & Carles Solà, 2006. "Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 300, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  9. Glauben, Thomas & Tietje, Hendrik & Weiss, Christoph R., 2004. "Sussession In Agriculture: A Probit And Competing Risk Analysis," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20067, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  10. Castaneda, Gonzalo, 2006. "Economic growth and concentrated ownership in stock markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 249-286, February.
  11. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory," MPRA Paper 17886, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Glauben, Thomas & Tietje, Hendrik & Weiss, Christoph R., 2005. "Analysing Family Farm Succession: A Probit and a Competing Risk Approach," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24699, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  13. Brandts, Jordi & Solà, Carles, 2010. "Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 246-253, February.
  14. Marco CUCCULELLI & Giacinto MICUCCI, 2006. "Entrepreneurship, Inherited Control and Firm Performance in Italian SMEs," Working Papers 258, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  15. Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp, 2002. "Trust As a Means of Improving Corporate Governance and Efficiency," IMF Working Papers 02/33, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen & Francisco Pérez-González & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2005. "Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Sep 2005.

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