Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

How Does Privatization Work? Ownership Concentration and Enterprise Performance in Ukraine

Contents:

Author Info

  • Alexander Pivovarsky
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This paper investigates the relationship between ownership concentration and enterprise performance in Ukraine. Using data on 376 medium and large enterprises, it finds that ownership concentration is positively associated with enterprise performance in Ukraine. The paper also finds that concentration of ownership by foreign companies and banks is associated with better performance than ownership concentrated by the domestic owners. Ownership by Ukrainian investment funds and holding companies does not have a positive effect on performance. In contrast to predictions by many observers of early transition, privatization methods had a lasting effect on ownership structure in Ukraine.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=4055
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/42.

    as in new window
    Length: 44
    Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/42

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
    Phone: (202) 623-7000
    Fax: (202) 623-4661
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

    Related research

    Keywords: Privatization; Governance; Transition economies; ownership concentration; ownership structure; privatization methods; investor protection; corporate governance; company law; state ownership; foreign companies; private ownership; holding companies; stock companies; commercial code; joint stock companies; minority shareholders; post-privatization ownership; enterprise restructuring; concentration of ownership; ownership structures; legal entities; corporate law; initial ownership; privatization ownership structure; privatization efforts; corporation; post-privatization ownership structure; stock exchange; commercial law; privatization program; shareholder protection; state-owned enterprises; privatization of enterprises; privatization work; mass privatization; corporate ownership; privatization method; effects of privatization; privatization programs; privatization plans; privatizations; process of privatization; corporate performance; method of privatization; shareholder meeting; state enterprises; commercial laws; price liberalization; insider trading; large shareholders; literature on privatization; corporations; privatization securities; privatization in transition economies; economics of transition; case-by-case privatization; privatization revenues; degree of privatization; shareholders ? meeting; privatization of state; privatization process; investment companies; agency costs; limited partnerships; ownership of shares; foreign company; privatization in transition countries; book value; legal aspects of privatization; shareholder protections; company laws; choice of privatization; firm performance; share ownership; number of shareholders; ambitious privatization; privatization agencies; commercial codes; voucher privatization; privatization vouchers; public markets; interested parties; minority shareholder; economic transition; shareholder meetings; benefits of privatization; financial statement; minority shareholder protection; state owned enterprises; boards of directors; articles of incorporation; privatization strategies; proxy vote; mass privatization programs; comparative corporate governance; minority interests; post-privatization performance; stock exchanges; private enterprises; privatization account; takeover bids; free distribution of shares; protection of investors; privatization option; financial statements; privatization history; exchange commission; controlling shareholders; privatization law; preparation for privatization; venture capital; objectives of privatization; share capital; privatization agency; privatization data; corporate ownership structure; privatization agenda; privatization voucher; majority shareholders; holding company; privatization model;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. J.S. Earle & S. Estrin, 1996. "Privatization Versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia," Working Papers wp96049, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    2. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus The Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899, August.
    3. John S. Earle & Saul Estrin, . "Privatization, Competition, and Budget Constraints: Disciplining Enterprises in Russia," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles jse20032, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    4. Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2047, The World Bank.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, 1997. "The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico," NBER Working Papers 6215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Djankov, Simeon & Murrell, Peter, 2002. "Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3319, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Privatizing Russia," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 139-192.
    8. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. " The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-52, June.
    9. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov, 1999. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 227, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    10. Estrin, Saul & Rosevear, Adam, 1999. "Enterprise Performance and Corporate Governance in Ukraine," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 442-458, September.
    11. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June.
    12. Anderson, James H. & Korsun, Georges & Murrell, Peter, 2000. "Which Enterprises (Believe They) Have Soft Budgets? Evidence on the Effects of Ownership and Decentralization in Mongolia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 219-246, June.
    13. Simon Johnson & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 1999. "Contract Enforcement in Transition," CESifo Working Paper Series 211, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. Andrew Weiss & Georgiy Nikitin, 1998. "Performance of Czech Companies by Ownership Structure," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 85, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    15. Pohl, G. & Anderson, R.E. & Claessens, S. & Djankov, S., 1997. "Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence and Policy Options," Papers 368, World Bank - Technical Papers.
    16. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," CID Working Papers 49, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    17. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Earle, John S & Estrin, Saul, 1997. "After Voucher Privatization: The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Russian Manufacturing Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1736, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Anderson, James H & Lee, Young & Murrell, Peter, 2000. "Competition and Privatization Amidst Weak Institutions: Evidence from Mongolia," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(4), pages 527-49, October.
    20. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 325-368, July.
    21. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislav Gelfer, 2000. "Law and finance in transition economies," Working Papers 48, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
    22. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Roman Frydman & Cheryl Gray & Marek Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1999. "When Does Privatization Work? The Impact Of Private Ownership On Corporate Performance In The Transition Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1153-1191, November.
    24. Simeon Djankov & Gerhard Pohl, 1997. "Restructuring of Large Firms in Slovakia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 73, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    25. Simeon Djankov & Gerhard Pohl, 1998. "The restructuring of large firms in the Slovak Republic," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 6(1), pages 67-85, 05.
    26. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    27. Vining, Aidan R & Boardman, Anthony E, 1992. " Ownership versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 205-39, March.
    28. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kaliberda, Aleksander, 1996. "Integrating the unofficial economy into the dynamics of post-socialist economies : a framework of analysis and evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1691, The World Bank.
    29. Blanchard, O. & Aghion, P., 1996. "On insider privatization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 759-766, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. J. David Brown & John S. Earle, 2002. "Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth under Alternative Economic Systems and Policies: Evidence from the Soviet Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 514, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. J. David Brown & John Earle, 2004. "Economic Reforms and Productivity-Enhancing Reallocation in the Post-Soviet Transition," CERT Discussion Papers 0404, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.