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How Does Privatization Work? Ownership Concentration and Enterprise Performance in Ukraine

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  • Alexander Pivovarsky
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    Abstract

    This paper investigates the relationship between ownership concentration and enterprise performance in Ukraine. Using data on 376 medium and large enterprises, it finds that ownership concentration is positively associated with enterprise performance in Ukraine. The paper also finds that concentration of ownership by foreign companies and banks is associated with better performance than ownership concentrated by the domestic owners. Ownership by Ukrainian investment funds and holding companies does not have a positive effect on performance. In contrast to predictions by many observers of early transition, privatization methods had a lasting effect on ownership structure in Ukraine.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/42.

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    Length: 44
    Date of creation: 01 Apr 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/42

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    Keywords: Privatization; Governance; Transition economies; ownership concentration; ownership structure; privatization methods; investor protection; corporate governance; company law; state ownership; foreign companies; private ownership; holding companies; stock companies; commercial code; joint stock companies; minority shareholders; post-privatization ownership; enterprise restructuring; concentration of ownership; ownership structures; legal entities; corporate law; initial ownership; privatization ownership structure; privatization efforts; corporation; post-privatization ownership structure; stock exchange; commercial law; privatization program; shareholder protection; state-owned enterprises; privatization of enterprises; privatization work; mass privatization; corporate ownership; privatization method; effects of privatization; privatization programs; privatization plans; privatizations; process of privatization; corporate performance; method of privatization; shareholder meeting; state enterprises; commercial laws; price liberalization; insider trading; large shareholders; literature on privatization; corporations; privatization securities; privatization in transition economies; economics of transition; case-by-case privatization; privatization revenues; degree of privatization; shareholders ? meeting; privatization of state; privatization process; investment companies; agency costs; limited partnerships; ownership of shares; foreign company; privatization in transition countries; book value; legal aspects of privatization; shareholder protections; company laws; choice of privatization; firm performance; share ownership; number of shareholders; ambitious privatization; privatization agencies; commercial codes; voucher privatization; privatization vouchers; public markets; interested parties; minority shareholder; economic transition; shareholder meetings; benefits of privatization; financial statement; minority shareholder protection; state owned enterprises; boards of directors; articles of incorporation; privatization strategies; proxy vote; mass privatization programs; comparative corporate governance; minority interests; post-privatization performance; stock exchanges; private enterprises; privatization account; takeover bids; free distribution of shares; protection of investors; privatization option; financial statements; privatization history; exchange commission; controlling shareholders; privatization law; preparation for privatization; venture capital; objectives of privatization; share capital; privatization agency; privatization data; corporate ownership structure; privatization agenda; privatization voucher; majority shareholders; holding company; privatization model;

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    Cited by:
    1. Brown, J. David & Earle, John S., 2002. "Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth Under Alternative Economic Systems and Policies: Evidence from the Soviet Transition," IZA Discussion Papers 644, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. J. David Brown & John Earle, 2004. "Economic Reforms and Productivity-Enhancing Reallocation in the Post-Soviet Transition," CERT Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University 0404, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    3. Cabeza-García, Laura & Gómez-Ansón, Silvia, 2011. "Post-privatisation ownership concentration: Determinants and influence on firm efficiency," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 412-430, September.
    4. John Marangos, 2002. "A post Keynesian critique of privatization policies in transition economies," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 573-589.

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