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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/20.

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Length: 25 pages
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/20

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Keywords: Banking ; Bank credit ; Economic models ;

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1. Degryse, H. & Jong, A. de, 2001. "Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?," Research Paper ERS-2001-86-F&A Revision_, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Degryse, Hans & de Jong, Abe, 2006. "Investment and internal finance: Asymmetric information or managerial discretion?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 125-147, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Wako Watanabe, 2004. "Prudential Regulation, the Credit Crunch" and the Ineffectiveness of Monetary Policy: Evidence from Japan," ISER Discussion Paper 0617, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
3. Allen N. Berger & Leora F. Klapper & Gregory F. Udell, 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-34, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Udell, Gregory F., 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2656, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • Allen N. Berger & Leora F. Klapper & Gegory F. Udell, 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 241-261.
   • Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Udell, Gregory F., 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 2127-2167, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.