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Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

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Author Info
Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia

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Abstract

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly-used quadratic loss function.

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Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/161.

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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 12 Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/161

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Keywords: Inflation targeting ; Economic models ;

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  1. Canadian Macro Study Group
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  2. A. Robert Nobay & David A. Peel, 1998. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences," FMG Discussion Papers dp306, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., 2004. "The inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 91-107, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  27. Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, 1994. "Restructuring, the NAIRU, and the Phillips curve," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 31-44.
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  30. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 1998. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 384-403, August.
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  31. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  33. Pesaran, M Hashem & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 1999. "Analysis of Exchange-Rate Target Zones Using a Limited-Dependent Rational-Expectations Model with Jumps," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 17(1), pages 50-66, January.
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  35. Nobay, A. R. & Peel, D. A., 2000. "Optimal monetary policy with a nonlinear Phillips curve," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 159-164, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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