Injury Investigations in Anti-Dumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation
AbstractEmpirical evidence shows that injury investigations in anti-dumping cases conducted by the United States International Trade Commission, the probability of a positive finding is higher when the number of defendant firms is larger, holding constant their total market share. In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation of this finding. We show that the presence of many exporters exacerbates the free-rider problem, which leads every firm to invest less on defense. Thus for the same market share, injury finding is more likely to be positive for many small sellers than a few large sellers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 01/110.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Poonam Gupta & Arvind Panagariya, 2006. "Injury Investigations in Antidumping and the Super-Additivity Effect: A Theoretical Explanation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 151-164, April.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1980.
"A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade,"
405, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
- James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995.
"Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole,"
NBER Working Papers
5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts Is Greater Than the Whole," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(4), pages 746-69, October.
- Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1996. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the Whole," Departmental Working Papers 199422, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Panagariya, Arvind & Rodrik, Dani, 1993.
"Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 685-703, August.
- Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992.
"The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990. "The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Stephen E. Haynes, 1999. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Antidumping Duties," NBER Working Papers 7378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- P. Tharakan & David Greenaway & Joe Tharakan, 1998.
"Cumulation and injury determination of the European community in antidumping cases,"
Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv),
Springer, vol. 134(2), pages 320-339, June.
- THARAKAN, P. K. Mathew & GREENAWAY, David & THARAKAN, Joe, . "Cumulation and injury determination of the European Community in antidumping cases," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1348, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- P.K.M. Tharakan & David Greenaway & Joe Tharakan,, . "Cumulation and Injury Determination of the European Community in Anti-Dumping Cases," Discussion Papers 97/17, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1986. "Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 285-299, November.
- James E. Anderson, 1993.
"Domino Dumping, II: Anti-dumping,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
219, Boston College Department of Economics.
- repec:att:wimass:9413 is not listed on IDEAS
- Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994.
"Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States,"
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," NBER Working Papers 4696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas J. Prusa, 1998.
"Cumulation and antidumping: A challenge to competition,"
Departmental Working Papers
199814, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Thomas J. Prusa, 1998. "Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(8), pages 1021-1033, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.