Currency Boards, Credibility, and Macroeconomic Behavior
AbstractCurrency boards operate differently from standard pegs. The former exhibit greater currency stability and lower transaction costs, inflation, and nominal interest rates, but are limited in their use of devaluation. We extend Drazen and Masson's (1994) signaling model to consider the choice between currency board arrangements and standard pegs. The model shows that currency boards' effectiveness hinges on their credibility properties and that they can improve welfare even with high unemployment persistence. By reducing expected inflation and the negative employment effect arising from expected but unrealized inflation, currency boards can produce less unemployment than peg regimes that abstain from devaluation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 00/97.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Luis A. Rivera-Batiz & Amadou N. R. Sy, 2013. "Currency Boards, Credibility, and Macroeconomic Behavior," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(3), pages 831-870, December.
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Drazen, Allan & Masson, Paul R, 1994.
"Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 109(3), pages 735-54, August.
- Paul R. Masson & Allan Drazen, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," IMF Working Papers 94/49, International Monetary Fund.
- Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1993. "Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers," NBER Working Papers 4448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atish R. Ghosh & Anne-Marie Gulde & Jonathan D. Ostry & Holger C. Wolf, 1997.
"Does the Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?,"
NBER Working Papers
5874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atish R. Ghosh & Anne-Marie Gulde & Jonathan D. Ostry & Holger C. Wolf, 1997. "Does The Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?," Working Papers 97-09, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Jonathan David Ostry & Anne Marie Gulde & Atish R. Ghosh & Holger C. Wolf, 1995. "Does the Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?," IMF Working Papers 95/121, International Monetary Fund.
- Daianu, Daniel & Vranceanu, Radu, 2003.
"Subduing High Inflation In Romania. How To Better Monetary And Exchange Rate Mechanisms?,"
Journal for Economic Forecasting,
Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(3), pages 5-36, September.
- Daniel Daianu & Radu Vranceanu, 2001. "Subduing High Inflation in Romania: How to Better Monetary and Exchange Rate Mechanisms?," The wiiw Balkan Observatory Working Papers 005, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw.
- Daniel Daianu & Radu Vranceanu, 2001. "Subduing High Inflation in Romania. How to Better Monetary and Exchange Rate Mechanisms?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 402, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Gregor Irwin, 2001. "Currency Boards and Currency Crises," Economics Series Working Papers 65, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Urmas Sepp & Raoul Lättemäe & Martti Randveer, 2002. "The History and Sustainability of the CBA in Estonia," Macroeconomics 0212002, EconWPA.
- Fuchun Jin, 2002. "A Model to Analyze the Macroeconomic Interdependence of Hong Kong with China and the United States," Working Papers 062002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Ying Wu, 2005. "Determining a Modified Currency Board's Two-Period Exchange Rate Strategy," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 347-357, November.
- Schmukler, Sergio L. & Serven, Luis, 2002.
"Pricing currency risk : facts and puzzles from currency boards,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2815, The World Bank.
- Sergio L. Schmukler & Luis Serven, 2002. "Pricing Currency Risk: Facts and Puzzles from Currency Boards," NBER Working Papers 9047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Diego Valderrama & Mark M. Spiegel, 2003. "Currency boards, dollarized liabilities, and monetary policy credibility," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 2003-07, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.