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The New Capital Adequacy Framework


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  • Cem Karacadag
  • Michael Taylor


This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee’s new proposals on bank capital standards. When compared with the existing Capital Accord, the proposals represent a shift across two intersecting dimensions—regulatory versus economic capital, and rules-based versus process-oriented regulation. On minimum capital standards, the case for using external ratings may be stronger than has been recognized, given the divergences in the purpose and design of internal ratings. On supervisory review, ensuring comparability among supervisors and building supervisory capacity will present serious challenges. On enhancing market discipline, incentives for markets to exercise discipline will be required.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 00/93.

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Length: 40
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:00/93

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Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
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Keywords: Capital; Bank supervision; banking; capital adequacy; credit risk; risk management; capital requirements; risk analysis; banking systems; bank capital; capital regulation; credit ratings; subordinated debt; capital requirement; emerging markets; deposit insurance; supervisory authorities; banking supervision; market risk; bank for international settlements; regulatory approach; banking sector; bank regulators; risk assessment; banking sectors; banking system; moral hazard; bankers; risk profile; supervisory agencies; bank of england; bank failure; risk modeling; bank regulation; bank management; banking crises; banks ? assets; banker; bank behavior; banking assets; banking industry; bank failures; bank balance sheets; financial systems; risk assessments; bank supervisors; level playing field; capital standard; supervisory capacities; bank capital regulation; pension funds; bank policy; basel accord; banking practices; bank market discipline; banking industries; bank holding companies; loan classification; credit risks; bank capital standard; accounting standards; bank activities; bank regulations; bank market; internal models approach; risk aversion; banking regulation; bank safety net; arbitrage; bank deposit; prudential bank supervision; bankers associations; bank safety; banking businesses; supervisory regime; bank directors; interbank market; bank holding; bank managements; bank capital standards; financial safety net; regulatory task; bank risk; bank managers; insurance coverage; deposit insurance coverage; applications; risk profiles; bank profitability; supervisory framework; bank clients; bank rating; return on equity;


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