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Depositor Behavior and Market Discipline in Colombia

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Author Info

  • Roberto Steiner
  • Adolfo Barajas

Abstract

This study examines how depositors choose among different banks and over time in Colombia, focusing on whether they discipline bank behavior. By controlling for a more comprehensive set of risk/return factors, the study improves upon conventional market discipline tests. Panel data estimations for 1985-99 show that depositors prefer banks with stronger fundamentals, and that banks tend to improve their fundamentals after being “punished” by depositors. Banks with stronger fundamentals benefit from lower interest costs and higher lending rates. Market (or “regulatory”) discipline therefore appears to exist in Colombia, perhaps thanks to certain key design features of the deposit insurance scheme.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 00/214.

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Length: 34
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:00/214

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Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
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Related research

Keywords: Banking systems; Markets; deposit insurance; deposit growth; banking; moral hazard; deposit interest; banking system; probability of default; deposit insurance scheme; deposit interest rates; financial institutions; bank deposits; bank size; bank runs; financial system; bank failures; bank performance; bank behavior; banking sector; banking crises; bank run; bank policy; return on assets; bank ownership; deposit rate; financial corporations; deposit rates; bank managers; bank distress; reserve ratio; bank management; financial liberalization; country comparison; capital base; financial safety net; bank fragility; bank failure; stock market; savings deposits; deposit guarantee; banking system stability; bank balance sheets; bank balance sheet; bank liquidity; bank regulators; financial fragility; bank insolvency; bank supervision; prudential bank supervision; return on equity; deposit insurance coverage; banking stability; bank lending rates; stock market index; banking panic; private bank; banking crisis; international reserves; financial sector; bank transaction; financial systems; financial reforms; bank lending; banking system distress; banking market;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sergio L. Schmukler & Eduardo Levy-Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2004. "Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 318, Econometric Society.
  2. Abhiman Das & Saibal Ghosh, 2004. "Market Discipline In The Indian Banking Sector: An Empirical Exploration," Finance 0410020, EconWPA.
  3. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2012. "Market Discipline during Crisis: Evidence from Bank Depositors in Transition Countries," MPRA Paper 43693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Önder, Zeynep & Özyildirim, Süheyla, 2008. "Market Reaction to Risky Banks: Did Generous Deposit Guarantee Change It?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1415-1435, August.
  5. Kathleen McDill & Andrea M. Maechler, 2003. "Dynamic Depositor Discipline in U.S. Banks," IMF Working Papers 03/226, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Adolfo Barajas & Mario Catalán, 2011. "Market Discipline and Conflicts of Interest Between Banks and Pension Funds," IMF Working Papers 11/282, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Juan Carlos Echeverry Garzón & Ángela María Fonseca Galvis, 2005. "The Social Impact of the Banking Sector in Colombia, 1995 – 2002," DEGIT Conference Papers c010_039, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
  8. Disli, Mustafa & Schoors, Koen & Meir, Jos, 2013. "Political connections and depositor discipline," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 804-819.
  9. Günther, Susanne, 2014. "Die Vermeidung von Bank Runs und der Erhalt von Marktdisziplin: Das Dilemma der Bankenregulierung?," Arbeitspapiere 142, Westfälsche Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU), Institut für Genossenschaftswesen.
  10. Li, Gan & Wen-Yao, Wang, 2010. "Partial Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard in Banking," MPRA Paper 25798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Carlos Budnevich L. & Helmut Franken M., 2003. "Market Discipline in Depositors’ Behavior and the Role of Risk-Rating Agencies: The Case of Chile," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 6(2), pages 45-70, August.
  12. Ece Ungan & Selçuk Caner & Süheyla Özyıldırım, 2008. "Depositors’ Assessment of Bank Riskiness in the Russian Federation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 77-100, April.
  13. Ghosh, Saibal & Das, Abhiman, 2006. "Depositor discipline in Indian banking: Separating facts from folklore," MPRA Paper 17427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2004. "Market Discipline in Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals," Business School Working Papers marketdiscipline, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  15. Edda Zoli & Danyang Xie & Reza Vaez-Zadeh, 2002. "Modis," IMF Working Papers 02/207, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Arnaud Bourgain & Patrice Pieretti & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2009. "International Financial competition and bank risk-taking in emerging economies," CREA Discussion Paper Series 09-08, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  17. Reza Vaez-Zadeh & Danyang Xie & Edda Zoli, 2002. "MODIS: A Market-Oriented Deposit Insurance Scheme," Finance 0212001, EconWPA.
  18. Maechler, Andrea M. & McDill, Kathleen M., 2006. "Dynamic depositor discipline in US banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1871-1898, July.
  19. Cubillas, Elena & Fonseca, Ana Rosa & González, Francisco, 2012. "Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2285-2298.

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