The Economics of Bank Restructuring
AbstractBased on a simple framework, this note clarifies the economics behind bank restructuring and evaluates various restructuring options for systemically important banks. The note assumes that the government aims to reduce the probability of a bankâ€™s default and keep the burden on taxpayers at a minimum. The note also acknowledges that the design of any restructuring needs to take into consideration the payoffs and incentives for the various key stakeholders (i.e., shareholders, debt holders, and government).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Staff Position Notes with number 2009/12.
Date of creation: 05 Jun 2009
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