Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

A Banking Union for the Euro Area

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rishi Goyal
  • Petya Koeva Brooks
  • Mahmood Pradhan
  • Thierry Tressel
  • Giovanni Dell'Ariccia
  • Ceyla Pazarbasioglu

Abstract

The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40317
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Staff Discussion Notes with number 13/01.

as in new window
Length: 31
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfsdn:13/01

Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA
Phone: (202) 623-7000
Fax: (202) 623-4661
Email:
Web page: http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Related research

Keywords: Banking systems; Europe; Euro Area; Bank supervision; Bank regulations; Bank resolution; Deposit insurance; Financial safety nets; Monetary unions; Banking Union; Single Supervisory Mechanism; Direct Recapitalization; European Stabilization Mechanism; Common Backstops; bank failures; bank recapitalization; deposit guarantee; banking sector; banking authority; bank funding; bank solvency; banking supervision; banking laws; bank balance sheets; bank liabilities; crisis management; bank borrowing; bank runs; banking system assets; decentralization; contingent liabilities; banking crises; banking markets; bank investor; banks � assets; financial strength; bank linkages; capital requirement; financial crisis; bank reforms; central banking; systemic risk; enforcement power; regulatory forbearance; bank safety; bank closure; banking assets; transmission of monetary policy; level playing field; bank creditors; bank claims; bank crisis; consolidated supervision;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Pau Rabanal & Dominic Quint, 2013. "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model of the Euro Area," 2013 Meeting Papers 604, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Nicolas Veron & Guntram B. Wolff, 2013. "From Supervision to Resolution: Next Steps on the Road to European Banking Union," Policy Briefs PB13-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  3. Michael Clauss, 2014. "The dynamics of European banking union: the process of its making and its role in future financial and economic integration," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(4), pages 68-76, 01.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfsdn:13/01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.