Financial Regulation Going Forward
AbstractThe financial sector is heavily regulated in order to prevent financial crises. The recent crisis showed how ineffective this regulation and other types of government intervention were in achieving this aim. We argue that the crisis was primarily caused by housing price bubbles. These occurred because of too loose monetary policies and the easy availability of credit resulting from the build up of large foreign exchange reserves by Asian central banks. A number of regulatory reforms are suggested. It is also argued that central banks need to have more checks and balances. Finally, the international financial architecture needs to be changed so that Asian countries do not feel the need to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan in its series IMES Discussion Paper Series with number 10-E-18.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
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Bubbles; Monetary Policy; Global Imbalances;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-07-31 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2010-07-31 (Central Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2010-07-31 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-REG-2010-07-31 (Regulation)
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