Disuación de entrada, subastas repetidas y divisibilidad del objeto en venta
AbstractThis paper analyzes entry deterrence strategies at sequential multi-unit English-type repeated auctions, motivated by entry deterrence observed at a series of yearly auctions of fishing rights occurring since the early 1990s in the Chilean Sea Bass industrial fishery. It analyzes parametric configurations under which incumbent firms may have followed non-cooperative entry deterrence strategies or else may have colluded for that purpose. A two-stage competition model is developed. In the first stage there occurs sequential auctioning of multiple fishing rights; in the second stage, production rights are used to compete in a homogeneous-good Cournot market. The analysis focuses on the relationship between the number of incumbents, sources of competitive advantage for them (relative to potential entrants) and the number and productive size of the multiple production rights in sale. The core of the analysis lies in answering how does the divisibility of the object(s) in sale affect the possibilities of incumbent firms for deterring the entry of new rivals.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv236.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-24 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 2011. "Cuotas de Pesca y Libre Competencia: Algunas Reflexiones para la Nueva Ley de Pesca," Documentos de Trabajo 405, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcela Perticara).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.