This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Diseño de la Subasta Optima para el Seguro de Invalidez y Sobreviviencia en Chile

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Eduardo Saavedra () (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)
Manuel Willington () (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Este artículo estudia la forma óptima de implementar el proceso de adjudicación del seguro de invalidez y sobrevivencia en Chile. Nuestro trabajo concluye que dadas las características con que fue diseñado el sistema de invalidez y sobrevivencia, y atendiendo a la estructura de la industria de seguros en el país, la subasta óptima es una combinación de subasta japonesa o (en este caso) descendente con salida en una primera etapa, con una subasta holandesa (primer precio sobre cerrado) en una segunda etapa. Nuestra propuesta considera las preocupaciones por la eficiencia de la subasta, las posibilidades de comportamientos anticompetitivos en ella, el deseo de favorecer la entrada de nuevos competidores y la siempre y necesaria simpleza de la propuesta. Más allá del interés particular en la subasta del Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia, el artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura de subastas accesible para no especialistas en el tema

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economia.uahurtado.cl/pdf/publicaciones/inv209.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv209.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv209

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Erasmo Escala 1835, 6500620 Santiago
Phone: (562) 692-0265
Fax: (562) 692-0303
Email:
Web page: http://www.economia.uahurtado.cl/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Marcela Perticara).

Related research
Keywords: Subastas; Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia; Fondos de Pensiones;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. McMillan, John, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-62, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All full texts are decentralized with the publishers, none reside on this server, thus making it possible to offer this service for free to all parties.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-8.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.