This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Mercados Informales y Control Vertical: Comercialización de Pesca Artesanal Perecible

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Julio Peña Torres () (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)
R. Javier Bustos S. (Master Student, ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile)
Claudio Pérez B. (Sociology Department, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile.)
Abstract

This paper offers an in-depth case study analysis about institutional changes occurring since the late 1990s at the Chilean Austral Hake artisanal fishery. This high-value exporting fishery, specialized on selling fresh-chilled products, represents a pioneering example of self-government developments within artisanal fishermen's communities exploiting mobile marine resources in Chile. Despite entry restrictions and global catch quotas, this fishery faced a productivity crisis from the late 1980s up to the second half of the 1990s. As a response to this, fishermen initiated talks with the Government in order to introduce new management rules. After gradual evolution, today there prevails a well-developed system of de facto individual non-transferable quotas subject to a high degree of self-management by fishermen organizations. We discuss industrial organization issues which condition the exchange solutions found at this fishery. In particular, we discuss incentives derived from industrial concentration and buyer power, vertical integration and other strategies of vertical control between transacting parties at this industry; namely, between wholesale marketing brokers, exporters, processors, direct buyers of the catch and fishermen. Contractual issues of relevancy are: the use of informal markets; multi-dimensional contracting; temporal specificity due to product perishability; the use of different instruments for vertical control; and the influence of increasing degrees of industrial concentration as we advance through the wholesale commercialization channel, moving closer to the retailing stages at final export markets.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economia.uahurtado.cl/pdf/publicaciones/inv161.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv161.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv161

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Erasmo Escala 1835, 6500620 Santiago
Phone: (562) 692-0265
Fax: (562) 692-0303
Email:
Web page: http://www.economia.uahurtado.cl/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Marcela Perticara).

Related research
Keywords: Producción y comercialización de Alimentos Cadenas de producción Control y Coordinación Vertical Pesca Artesanal en Chile Merluza Austral.

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 695-715, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Colin W. Clark & Gordon R. Munro, 1980. "Fisheries and the Processing Sector: Some Implications for Management Policy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 603-616, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Seabright, Paul, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-34, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kenney, Roy W & Klein, Benjamin, 1983. "The Economics of Block Booking," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 497-540, October.
  6. William E. Schworm, 1983. "Monopsonistic Control of a Common Property Renewable Resource," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 275-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-27.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.