Levinsky, Rene (CERGEI-EI, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic) Silarszky, Peter (CERGEI-EI, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)
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In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union (EU). The goal of this paper is to evaluate the voting power of the member states after the entry of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyse the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.
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Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series East European Series with number
56.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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