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The Double Majority Principle and Decision Making Games in Extending European Union

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Author Info
Turnovec, Frantisek (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

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Abstract

In this paper game-theoretical concepts of power indices are applied to evaluation of power (or influence) distribution among different European Union member states in a decision making processes in the Council of Ministers, Commission and European Parliament. Dynamics of distribution of power during a sequence of extensions is analyzed and possible consequences of future East European and Mediterranean extensions anticipated. A new voting rule concept is suggested and evaluated: the so called double majority principle, based on two sets of weights in voting: one given by the number of votes in a decision making body and the second by the proportion of GDP or proportion of population. Models of Commission, Council, and European Union interactions are investigated from the point of view of power distribution among the member states and among the three most important European institutions.

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File URL: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/east/ro-48.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 1997
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series East European Series with number 48.

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Length: 73 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1997
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Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsrop:48

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Related research
Keywords: Coalition; Commission; Council of Ministers; Distribution of Power; Double Majority; European Parliament; Power Indices; Voting Procedures; Voting Weights;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General

Cited by:
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  1. Matthias Sutter, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 41-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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