On the Evolution of Altruism
AbstractWe demonstrate how altruism can flourish in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling and that the probability than an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number 46.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Jun 1997
Date of revision:
Postal: Institute for Advanced Studies - Library, Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna, Austria
Other versions of this item:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
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