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An Exact Implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies

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Author Info

  • Trockel, Walter

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld)

Abstract

For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem.

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File URL: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-25.pdf
File Function: First version, 1996
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Studies in its series Economics Series with number 25.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Feb 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:25

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Related research

Keywords: Nash Programm; Implementation; Nash Bargaining Solution;

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Cited by:
  1. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.

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