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The Political Economy of Public Education

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  • Jorge Soares

Abstract

This work focuses on the political determination of a public education policy within the context of a general equilibrium macroeconomic model. The primary objective of this paper is to study whether publicly funded education can emerge and be sustained as a political and economic equilibrium in an economy where individual agents are selfish, rational and forward-looking. I construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model that endogenizes the large involvement of the public sector in human capital investment. The agents work for the first two periods of their lives and then retire during the third period. The first generation agents may also allocate resources to the acquisition of human capital, but they cannot borrow against their future income. In a political equilibrium where the rational and forward-looking agents of the two oldest generations vote for a level of public funding of education, public financing of education is motivated by the complementarity between capital and labor in the production function and appears as an instrument to compensate for the absence of credit markets. Thus, public funding of education does not have to be chosen because of altruism or externalities. In an economy calibrated using U.S. data, I can match the high shares of GNP allocated to education observed in the U.S. economy. The share of publicly funded education is an increasing function of GNP which mirrors the observed disparities across countries with different levels of development. Furthermore, an increase in the social security tax rate reduces the share of GNP allocated to publicly funded education which might help explain differences across countries with similar levels of development. The constructed economy also supports the existence of poverty traps for relatively low levels of income per capita. An interesting feature is that, if we do not allow the young agents to work, the economy will get out of these poverty traps and will converge to a steady-state with high levels of physical and human capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Soares, "undated". "The Political Economy of Public Education," Working Papers 106, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:106
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    Cited by:

    1. Ono, Tetsuo & Uchida, Yuki, 2018. "Human capital, public debt, and economic growth: A political economy analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-14.
    2. Calin Arcalean & Ioana Schiopu, 2016. "Inequality, opting-out and public education funding," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 811-837, April.
    3. Ono, Tetsuo & Uchida, Yuki, 2016. "Pensions, education, and growth: A positive analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 127-143.
    4. Tetsuo Ono & Yuki Uchida, 2018. "Capital Income Taxation, Economic Growth, and the Politics of Public Education," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-05, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Uchida, Yuki & Ono, Tetsuo, 2021. "Generational conflict and education politics: Implications for growth and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Uchida, Yuki & Ono, Tetsuo, 2021. "Political economy of taxation, debt ceilings, and growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    7. Uchida, Yuki & Ono, Tetsuo, 2022. "Politics of Public Education and Pension Reform with Endogenous Fertility," MPRA Paper 112748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Michael Kaganovich & Volker Meier, 2012. "Social Security Systems, Human Capital, and Growth in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(4), pages 573-600, August.
    9. Tetsuo Ono, 2015. "Public education and social security: a political economy approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, February.
    10. Bishnu, Monisankar & Wang, Min, 2017. "The political intergenerational welfare state," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 93-110.
    11. Calin Arcalean & Ioana Schiopu, 2010. "Inequality and Education Funding Theory and Evidence from the U.S. School Districts," CAEPR Working Papers 2010-009, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    12. John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2014. "The composition of government expenditure with alternative choicemechanisms," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 53-71, April.
    13. Economides, George & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Sakkas, Stelios, 2017. "Tuition fees: User prices and private incentives," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 91-103.
    14. Kaganovich, Michael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 2012. "Pay-as-you-go or funded social security? A general equilibrium comparison," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 455-467.
    15. Georges Casamatta & L. Batté, 2016. "The Political Economy of Population Aging," Post-Print hal-02520521, HAL.
    16. Tetsuo Ono, 2014. "Economic Growth and the Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 14-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    17. Soares, Jorge, 2003. "Self-interest and public funding of education," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 703-727, March.
    18. George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Stylianos Sakkas, 2021. "Redistributive policies in general equilibrium," JRC Working Papers on Territorial Modelling and Analysis 2021-08, Joint Research Centre.
    19. Michael Kaganovich & Itzhak Zilcha, 2008. "Alternative Social Security Systems and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2353, CESifo.
    20. Dotti, Valerio, 2020. "Income inequality, size of government, and tax progressivity: A positive theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    21. George Economides & Hyun Park & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Stelios Sakkas, 2015. "On the Composition of Public Spending and Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 5510, CESifo.
    22. John Creedy & Solmaz Moslehi, 2014. "The composition of government expenditure with alternative choicemechanisms," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(1), pages 53-71, April.
    23. Jorge Soares, "undated". "Altruism and Self-interest in a Political Economy of Public Education," Working Papers 130, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    24. Casamatta, G. & Batté, L., 2016. "The Political Economy of Population Aging," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 381-444, Elsevier.

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