IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iep/wpidep/1004.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do High Tax and Tax Evasion go Hand in Hand? The Non-Linear Case

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Trannoy

    (EHESS, Greqam-Idep)

  • Gwenola Trotin

    (EQUIPPE, Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3)

Abstract

This paper fully investigates how a tax rate change can affect tax evasion, under the expected utility theory hypothesis. We generalize the Allingham-Sandmo benchmark model of tax evasion, using very general non-linear specifications for the tax schedule and the fine scheme. We consider both interior and corner solutions in terms of tax evasion. When the fine is imposed on the evaded tax, we examine the robustness of Yitzhaki’s result of a positive relationship between a change in tax rate and undeclared income. When the fine is imposed on the undeclared income, we obtain conditions under which Allingham and Sandmo’s result of a inverse relationship remains valid, and particularly with DARA. The case of an endogenous audit probability is also considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Trannoy & Gwenola Trotin, 2010. "Do High Tax and Tax Evasion go Hand in Hand? The Non-Linear Case," IDEP Working Papers 1004, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jul 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:iep:wpidep:1004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.idep-fr.org/IMG/pdf/dt_1004.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bayer, Ralph-C., 2006. "A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1071-1104, July.
    2. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Monica Paiella, 2011. "Relative Risk Aversion Is Constant: Evidence From Panel Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(6), pages 1021-1052, December.
    3. Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1973. "A note on optimum tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 265-270, July.
    4. Panades, Judith, 2001. "Tax evasion and Ricardian equivalence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 799-815, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Tax Evasion Numbers
      by Ariel Goldring in Free Market Mojo on 2010-08-19 17:24:55

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gwenola Trotin, 2012. "Solving the Yitzhaki Paradox," AMSE Working Papers 1238, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Amedeo Piolatto & Gwenola Trotin, 2016. "Optimal Income Tax Enforcement under Prospect Theory," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 29-41, February.
    3. Gwenola Trotin, 2012. "Solving the Yitzhaki Paradox: Income Tax Evasion and Reference Dependence under Prospect Theory," Working Papers halshs-00793664, HAL.
    4. Gwenola Trotin & Amedeo Piolatto, 2011. "Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francisco Martínez-Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Off-the-peak preferences over government size," Working Papers 2009-9, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    2. Rainer Niemann & Mariana Sailer, 2023. "Is analytical tax research alive and kicking? Insights from 2000 until 2022," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 93(6), pages 1149-1212, August.
    3. Laurent E. Calvet & Paolo Sodini, 2014. "Twin Picks: Disentangling the Determinants of Risk-Taking in Household Portfolios," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 867-906, April.
    4. Robert Östling & Erik Lindqvist & David Cesarini & Joseph Briggs, 2016. "Wealth, Portfolio Allocations, and Risk Preference," 2016 Meeting Papers 1089, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Alserda, Gosse A.G. & Dellaert, Benedict G.C. & Swinkels, Laurens & van der Lecq, Fieke S.G., 2019. "Individual pension risk preference elicitation and collective asset allocation with heterogeneity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 206-225.
    6. Freudenreich, Hanna & Musshoff, Oliver & Wiercinski, Ben, 2017. "The Relationship between Farmers' Shock Experiences and their Uncertainty Preferences - Experimental Evidence from Mexico," GlobalFood Discussion Papers 256212, Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, GlobalFood, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development.
    7. Jakusch, Sven Thorsten, 2017. "On the applicability of maximum likelihood methods: From experimental to financial data," SAFE Working Paper Series 148, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2017.
    8. Ikefuji, M. & Laeven, R.J.A. & Magnus, J.R. & Muris, C.H.M., 2010. "Burr Utility," Discussion Paper 2010-81, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Ikefuji, M. & Laeven, R.J.A. & Magnus, J.R. & Muris, C.H.M., 2010. "Burr Utility," Other publications TiSEM fddee215-edea-4800-ba72-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Abootaleb Shirvani & Stoyan V. Stoyanov & Frank J. Fabozzi & Svetlozar T. Rachev, 2019. "Equity Premium Puzzle or Faulty Economic Modelling?," Papers 1909.13019, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    10. Gomes, Francisco & Fugazza, Carolina & Campanale, Claudio, 2015. "Life-Cycle Portfolio choice with Liquid and Illiquid Assets," CEPR Discussion Papers 10369, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Hundsdoerfer, Jochen & Sielaff, Christian & Blaufus, Kay & Kiesewetter, Dirk & Weimann, Joachim, 2010. "The name game for contributions: Influence of labeling and earmarking on the perceived tax burden," Discussion Papers 2010/12, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    12. Bayer, Ralph & Cowell, Frank, 2016. "Tax compliance by firms and audit policy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 38-52.
    13. Satya R. Chakravarty & Nachiketa Chattopadhyay & Jacques Silber & Guanghua Wan, 2016. "Measuring the impact of vulnerability on the number of poor: a new methodology with empirical illustrations," Chapters, in: Jacques Silber & Guanghua Wan (ed.), The Asian ‘Poverty Miracle’, chapter 4, pages 84-117, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Philipp Ager & Antonio Ciccone, 2018. "Agricultural Risk and the Spread of Religious Communities," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 1021-1068.
    15. Jiao Li & Duccio Gamannossi Degl'Innocenti & Matthew D. Rablen, 2021. "Marketed Tax Avoidance Schemes: An Economic Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 9421, CESifo.
    16. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar & Mani, Subha, 2017. "Searching for preference stability in a state dependent world," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 17-32.
    17. Tomoya Suzuki, 2016. "Cash benefits for poverty relief from the viewpoint of suicide prevention," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 6(3), pages 489-498, December.
    18. Bayer, Ralph & Cowell, Frank, 2009. "Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1131-1143, December.
    19. Daisuke Matsuzaki & Yoshiyasu Ono, 2023. "Economic stimulus effects of product innovation under demand stagnation," ISER Discussion Paper 1204r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2023.
    20. Bayer, Ralph-C & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "The excess burden of tax evasion--An experimental detection-concealment contest," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 527-543, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; Non-linearity; Expected utility theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iep:wpidep:1004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gregory Cornu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/amseafr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.