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When Kolm Meets Mirrless: ELIE

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Author Info

  • Alain Trannoy

    ()
    (Greqam-Idep, EHESS)

  • Laurent Simula

    ()
    (National University of Singapore and IDEP)

Abstract

This article discusses the properties of Kolm’s ELIE proposal in the Context of optimal income taxation “à la Mirrlees”. It first shows that ELIE gives rise to non-standard type-dependent budget sets, which has important implications in terms of a minimum labour requirement. Second, it adopts the Mirrleesian framework to characterize ELIE as a first-best tax scheme and casts light on the very specific shape of the distribution of social weights that generate it. Third, it shows that ELIE is incentive compatible only when both gross income and time worked are verifiable, which seems to be a strong assumption for a non-negligible number of taxpayers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France in its series IDEP Working Papers with number 0811.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision: Aug 2008
Handle: RePEc:iep:wpidep:0811

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Related research

Keywords: ELIE; Income Redistribution; Optimal Taxation; Incentive Compatibility.;

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References

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  1. Mirrlees, James A., 1996. "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1996-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
  2. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
  3. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter, 1980. "Fully progressive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-154, April.
  4. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Sébastien Gharbi & Yves Meinard, 2012. "Sur le sens du non welfarisme dans le modèle ELIE de redistribution des revenus de Kolm," AMSE Working Papers 1237, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
  2. Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2008. "An Exploration of Incentive-Compatible ELIE," IDEP Working Papers 0812, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 14 Dec 2008.
  3. Jean-Sébastien Gharbi & Yves Meinard, 2012. "Sur le Sens du Non Welfarisme dans le Modèle ELIE de Redistribution des Revenus de Kolm," Working Papers halshs-00793658, HAL.

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