When Kolm Meets Mirrless: ELIE
AbstractThis article discusses the properties of Kolm’s ELIE proposal in the Context of optimal income taxation “à la Mirrlees”. It first shows that ELIE gives rise to non-standard type-dependent budget sets, which has important implications in terms of a minimum labour requirement. Second, it adopts the Mirrleesian framework to characterize ELIE as a first-best tax scheme and casts light on the very specific shape of the distribution of social weights that generate it. Third, it shows that ELIE is incentive compatible only when both gross income and time worked are verifiable, which seems to be a strong assumption for a non-negligible number of taxpayers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France in its series IDEP Working Papers with number 0811.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision: Aug 2008
ELIE; Income Redistribution; Optimal Taxation; Incentive Compatibility.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-PUB-2009-01-17 (Public Finance)
- NEP-SEA-2009-01-17 (South East Asia)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
- Mirrlees, James A, 1997.
"Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(444), pages 1311-29, September.
- Mirrlees, James A., 1996. "Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1996-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter, 1980. "Fully progressive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-154, April.
- Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
- Jean-Sébastien Gharbi & Yves Meinard, 2012. "Sur le sens du non welfarisme dans le modèle ELIE de redistribution des revenus de Kolm," AMSE Working Papers 1237, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
- Jean-Sébastien Gharbi & Yves Meinard, 2012. "Sur le Sens du Non Welfarisme dans le Modèle ELIE de Redistribution des Revenus de Kolm," Working Papers halshs-00793658, HAL.
- Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2008. "An Exploration of Incentive-Compatible ELIE," IDEP Working Papers 0812, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 14 Dec 2008.
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