Chang-Ho Yoon () (Department of Economics, Korea University) Young-Woong Song (SK Research Institute for SUPEX Management) Byoung Heon Jun () (Department of Economics, Korea University)
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In the recent decade, global backbone providers have emerged to link dispersed networks. Local networks obtain global connectivity through transit contracts with switching hubs. Using the Shapley value, the paper shows that the bargaining position of the local network depends upon the quality adjusted volume of net traffic, and that the rent to the hub depends on the volume of traffic between local networks. When there are two competing switching hubs, the larger hub can appropriate most of the rent. Anticipating this, the hubs tend to expand their capacity to preempt the market like in the prisoners¡¯ dilemma.
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
0507.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994.
"Bargaining and Value,"
Economics Working Papers
114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
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