Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty contest
AbstractRecent literature has emphasized that individuals display different depths of reasoning when playing games. In this paper, we explore gender differences in strategic sophistication and study whether these differences are endogenous. We report results from two different experiments employing the beauty contest. In the first, large study, we show that females react very strongly to incentives to the extent that gender differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. In the second study, we use a within subject design to analyze how depth of reasoning varies with gender priming and the gender composition of the set of players. We corroborate that females display higher levels of sophistication and even overtake males when incentives are provided and gender is primed. On the other hand, males who believe that females are better in the game display higher sophistication when playing against females.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2014/13.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 2014
Date of revision:
Guessing game; strategic sophistication; gender; beliefs; stereotype threat;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2014-03-30 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DEM-2014-03-30 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2014-03-30 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2014-03-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2014-03-30 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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