The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007
AbstractIn this paper we empirically analyze the socio-economic determinants of the existence of military dictatorships in Africa. A recent literature in political economy analyses the relationship between the civil undemocratic government and the military as an agency problem: the civilian government needs the army to avoid internal violence, but a larger army reduces the opportunity-cost for the military to run a coup d’état and seize power. These papers derive three main causes of military rule: income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and external threat. We empirically analyze these issues by estimating the probability that a country experiences a military rule. We consider 48 African countries over the period 1970-2007.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2011/26.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Jacopo Costa & Raul Caruso & Roberto Ricciuti, 2012. "The Probability of Military Rule in Africa, 1970-2007," Working Papers 17/2012, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Probability of military dictatorship
by UDADISI in UDADISI on 2012-05-13 11:06:00
by himaginary in himaginaryの日記 on 2012-05-20 07:00:00
- Caruso, Raul & Petrarca , Ilaria & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2013. "Is there a Diffusion of Military Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa? Empirical Evidence in the Period 1972-2007," NEPS Working Papers 4/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
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