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Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution

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Author Info
Jonathan Rodden () (Stanford University)
Abstract

Why do some federations implement highly progressive intergovernmental transfer schemes while others do not? First, this essay establishes some stylized facts, using provincial-level data from nine federations to measure the extent of inter-regional redistribution achieved through intergovernmental transfers in each country. Second, it explores sources of institutional variation that might help account for these persistent cross-country differences, focusing on theories of legislative bargaining, representation, and the distribution of income across regions. Third, it examines the historical conditions under which the basic institutions of federalism were selected.

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Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2009/3.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/4/doc2009-3

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Related research
Keywords: Federalism; redistribution; inter-governmental transfers; representation.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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References listed on IDEAS
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