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Optimal country's policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies

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  • Osiris J. Parcero

    ()
    (United Arab Emirates University)

Abstract

This paper looks at a county’s central government optimal policy in a setting where its two identical local regions compete for the attraction of footloose multinationals to their sites, and where the considered multinationals strictly prefer this country to the rest of the world. For the sake of reality the model allows the local regions to choose between the implementation of firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies. We find that, even though the two local regions are identical, some degree of regional tax competition is good for country’s welfare. Moreover, we show that the implementation of the regional firmspecific policies weakly welfare dominates the implementation of the regional non-firmspecific ones. Hence the not infrequent calls for the central government to ban the former type of policies go against the advice of this paper.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2009/34.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/10/doc2009-34

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Related research

Keywords: FDI; regional; tax competition; concurrent taxation; bargaining; tax posting; footloose multinational; optimal policy; country’s welfare;

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  15. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
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