Optimal country's policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies
AbstractThis paper looks at a county’s central government optimal policy in a setting where its two identical local regions compete for the attraction of footloose multinationals to their sites, and where the considered multinationals strictly prefer this country to the rest of the world. For the sake of reality the model allows the local regions to choose between the implementation of firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies. We find that, even though the two local regions are identical, some degree of regional tax competition is good for country’s welfare. Moreover, we show that the implementation of the regional firmspecific policies weakly welfare dominates the implementation of the regional non-firmspecific ones. Hence the not infrequent calls for the central government to ban the former type of policies go against the advice of this paper.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2009/34.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
FDI; regional; tax competition; concurrent taxation; bargaining; tax posting; footloose multinational; optimal policy; country’s welfare;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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