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Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count

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  • Orestis Troumpounis

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    (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

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    Abstract

    I consider a two-party parliamentary election where parties compete on a quality (or valence) dimension. First I motivate why in such an election a voter may decide to cast a blank vote. Second I define a new voting system, inspired in the standard proportional representation system, where the percentage of blank votes is translated into vacant seats in the parliament. I analyze party competition assuming adapted versions of the models of “Bertand” and “Cournot”. I compare the equilibrium outcomes on parties’ quality and profits obtained with both the alternative proportional system and the standard one. I show that society and parties may have interests in conflict.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2009/30.

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    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/10/doc2009-30

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    Keywords: electoral systems; blank voting; proportional representation systems; endogenous valence;

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    1. Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
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