Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Buyer Power and Intraband Coordination

Contents:

Author Info

  • Miklos-Thal, Jeanine
  • Rey, Patrick
  • Vergé, Thibaud

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2008/buyer.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 500.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of the European Economic Association, vol.�9, n°4, août 2011, p.�721-741.
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:8661

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 89
Fax: + 33 (0)5 61 12 86 37
Email:
Web page: http://www.idei.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Joshua Gans & Catherine de Fontenay, 2004. "Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 7, Econometric Society.
  2. McAfee, R. Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1995. "The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 251-259, September.
  3. William Comanor & Patrick Rey, 2000. "Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 135-153, September.
  4. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Verge, 2002. "Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Cartel," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/047, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
  6. Igor Muraviev, 2007. "Equilibrium Configurations of Distribution Channels in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," Working Papers hal-00243078, HAL.
  7. Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 823-843, 09.
  8. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
  9. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, 2003. "Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0309005, EconWPA.
  10. Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
  11. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
  12. Schwartz, Marius, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1063-68, December.
  13. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Fumagalli, Chiara & Polo, Michele, 2007. "Buyer power and quality improvements," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 45-61, June.
  14. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
  15. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
  16. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410, July.
  17. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-62, December.
  18. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
  19. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  20. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1992. "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 299-308, Autumn.
  21. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 757-791, 05.
  22. Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, 2007. "The Economics of Slotting Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 421-454.
  23. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December.
  24. Michael D. Whinston & Ilya R. Segal, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March.
  25. Shaffer Greg, 2005. "Slotting Allowances and Optimal Product Variety," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-28, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Pio Baake & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2014. "The Impact of Upfront Payments on Assortment Decisions in Retailing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 95-111, February.
  2. Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Christian Wey, 2014. "Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1408, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  3. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Johansen, Bjørn Olav, 2013. "Resale Price Maintenance And Up-Front Payments: Achieving Horizontal Control Under Seller And Buyer Power," Working Papers in Economics 02/13, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  4. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Johansen, Bjørn Olav, 2012. "Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets," Working Papers in Economics 01/12, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  5. Chris Doyle & Martijn Han, 2014. "Cartelization Through Buyer Groups," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 255-275, May.
  6. Bedre-Defolie, Ö., 2012. "Vertical coordination through renegotiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 553-563.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:8661. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.