1. Jean Tirole, 1985. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies," Working papers 363, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
2. Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Papers 652, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   Other versions:
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998. "Information Accumulation in Development," Seminar Papers 652, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. " Information Accumulation in Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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   • Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June. [Downloadable!]
4. Stein, Jeremy C, 1997. "Waves of Creative Destruction: Firm-Specific Learning-by-Doing and the Dynamics of Innovation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 265-88, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1989. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 8904, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1990. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," DELTA Working Papers 90-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
   • Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 1990. "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," NBER Working Papers 3223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Aghion, P. & Howitt, P., 1989. "A Model Of Growth Through Creative Destruction," Working papers 527, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1992. "A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 323-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," IDEI Working Papers 167, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 253-279, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Martimort, David, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 929-47, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1999. "Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 2128, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1999. "Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 825-52, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
12. Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth," DELTA Working Papers 1999-08, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
    • Martimort, D. & Verdier, T., 1999. "The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth," Papers 1999-08, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
    • Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. " The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 315-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. David Thesmar & Mathias Thoenig, 2000. "Creative Destruction And Firm Organization Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1201-1237, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Patrick Francois & Joanne Roberts, 2003. "Contracting Productivity Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(1), pages 59-85, January.
    Other versions:
    • Patrick Francois & Joanne Roberts, 2000. "Contracting Productivity Growth," Working Papers jorob-99-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Francois, P. & Roberts, J., 2001. "Contracting productivity growth," Discussion Paper 35, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
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1. Straub, Stephane, 2008. "Infrastructure and development : a critical appraisal of the macro level literature," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4590, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephane Straub, 2008. "Infrastructure and Development: A Critical Appraisal of the Macro-level Literature," ESE Discussion Papers 178, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
2. Ottaviano, Gianmarco Ireo Paolo, 2007. "Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 6419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]