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Transmission constraints and strategic underinvestment in electric power generation

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  • Léautier, Thomas-Olivier

Abstract

This article is the first to examine electric power producers' investment decisions when competition is imperfect and the transmission grid congested. This analysis yields numerous original insights. First, congestion on the grid is transient, and may disappear when demand is highest. Second, transmission capacity increases have complex impacts on generation: they may increase, decrease, or have no impact on the marginal value of generation, and may have similar or opposite impacts on the marginal value of different technologies. Third, the true social value of transmission, including its impact on investment, may be significantly lower than is commonly assumed.

Suggested Citation

  • Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2014. "Transmission constraints and strategic underinvestment in electric power generation," IDEI Working Papers 816, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:27856
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Reliability and competitive electricity markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 60-84, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    electric power markets; imperfect competition; investment; transmission constraints;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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