A communication game on electoral platforms
AbstractThis paper proposes a game to study strategic communication on platforms by parties. Parties’ platforms have been chosen in a multidimensional policy space, but are imperfectly known by voters. Parties strategically decide the emphasis they put on the various issues, and thus the precision of the information they convey to voters on their position on each issue. The questions we address are the following: what are the equilibria of this communication game? How many issues will they address? Will parties talk about the same issues or not? Will they talk on issues that they "own" or not?
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Date of creation: 23 Nov 2009
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Other versions of this item:
- Demange, Gabrielle & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "A communication game on electoral platforms," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 09-112, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-01-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-01-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2010-01-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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