The resolution of problems with lease renewals in Fiji, particularly in the sugarcane districts, has ramifications for private investment and growth in the entire economy. The impending withdrawal of subsidies to sugar as world trade is liberalised has increased the urgency of finding solutions to these problems. This paper draws on game theory to characterise the problems facing the Fiji sugar industry. The incentives for land and ethnic politics are identified. Separate proposals are put forward to facilitate secure access to land and to minimise adjustment costs from the erosion of preferences under the Sugar Protocol. The rationalisation forced upon the sugar industry, if managed well, could induce land reforms that could improve the investment climate and the prospects for growth, whilst minimising pains of adjustment.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Find related papers by JEL classification: O49 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Other Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: