Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina
Abstract
This paper takes advantage of several reforms that provide time and cross sectional variation to identify the effects of unemployment insurance and severance payments on the duration of unemployment and on the separation probability in Argentina. Administrative data permits analysis of the duration of unemployment of covered spells with detailed information about transfers and their duration, while household surveys permit the study of separation probability and transitions to informal jobs, which are not observed in administrative data. It is found that unemployment duration increases significantly when unemployment insurance transfers are higher or are provided for a longer period; the effects of severance pay on unemployment duration are less robust. On the other hand, higher severance pay is found to reduce separation probability, while unemployment insurance transfers have a positive but small effect on separations.Download Info
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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4759.Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4759
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Related research
Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-IUE-2012-05-15 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2012-05-15 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAM-2012-05-15 (Central & South America)
- NEP-LTV-2012-05-15 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina
by Maximo Rossi in Wikiprogress América Latina on 2012-05-22 16:38:00
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