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¿Debe el gobierno participar en la actividad bancaria? El papel de la banca propiedad del Estado y de la banca de fomento

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Author Info

  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati
  • Alejandro Micco
  • Ugo Panizza

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este documento se revisa la obra publicada teórica y empírica sobre el papel de los bancos propiedad del Estado y también se presentan algunos resultados nuevos y un análisis de validez. Se muestra que la banca propiedad del Estado de países en desarrollo tiene costos fiscales porque se caracteriza por un menor rendimiento que los bancos privados del mismo tipo (por otro lado, no hay elementos que comprueben que los bancos propiedad del Estado de países industrializados sean menos rentables que sus contrapartes privadas). A continuación señalamos que esta prueba no se puede usar como argumento contra la existencia de la banca propiedad del Estado, ya que esta baja rentabilidad puede ser producto de la participación de los bancos propiedad del Estado en proyectos caracterizados por una baja inversión del sector privado y elevados retornos sociales. Si bien no hallamos pruebas de que la presencia de bancos propiedad del Estado promueva el crecimiento económico o el desarrollo financiero, también hallamos que las pruebas de que esas instituciones conducen a un menor crecimiento y desarrollo financiero no son tan sólidas como se creía.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4380.

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Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4380

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