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Hacia un sistema de seguro social eficaz en América Latina: la importancia de una política fiscal anticíclica

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Author Info

  • Miguel Braun
  • Luciano di Gresia

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) América Latina es una región inestable y propensa a las crisis, con sistemas inadecuados de seguridad social. Por lo tanto, los pobres de larga data al igual que los pobres más recientes sufren considerablemente durante las crisis. Además, el gasto social en la región es cíclico, pero en menor medida que el gasto total, lo que indica que la eficacia de las políticas sociales compensadoras concebidas para proteger a los más vulnerables contra las crisis están limitadas por los ajustes durante las recesiones. Las causas de las políticas fiscales cíclicas radican en las limitantes políticas del ahorro durante los períodos de crecimiento, combinadas con una solvencia limitada durante las recesiones, y una mayor inestabilidad económica y una baja participación de mecanismos automáticos de estabilización en el presupuesto. Evaluamos las opciones de políticas destinadas a reducir la naturaleza cíclica de la política fiscal, tales como los fondos de estabilización, las reglas fiscales y la reforma de las instituciones encargadas del presupuesto, y abogamos por propuestas de políticas integradas basadas en una mayor medida de análisis de países específicos, tales como la Ley de Responsabilidad Fiscal de Brasil.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4334.

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Date of creation: Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4334

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