Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study
AbstractThis paper uses an experimental field approach to investigate the pro-social preferences and behavior of social services providers and the behavior of potential beneficiaries in Bogota, Colombia. Field experiments were conducted using games including a newly designed Distributive Dictator Game in order to examine traits and mechanisms guiding pro-sociality. Replicating the patterns of previous studies, individuals showed a preference for fair outcomes, positive levels of trust and reciprocity, and willingness to punish unfair outcomes. The results provide evidence that the poor trigger more pro-social behavior from all citizens, including public servants, but the latter display strategic generosity. Additional observations include a bias in favor of women and households with more dependents, but discriminatory behavior against stigmatized groups.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 3247.
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Natalia Candelo & Alejandro Gaviria & Sandra Polania, 2007. "Discrimination in the provision of social services to the poor: a field experimental study," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 003885, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Natalia Candelo & Alejandro Gaviria & Sandra Polanía & Rajiv Sethi, 2008. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study," IDB Publications 43838, Inter-American Development Bank.
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2008-10-21 (Development)
- NEP-EXP-2008-10-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAM-2008-10-21 (Central & South America)
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