Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy?: A Pecuniary Externality Perspective
AbstractIn the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged in which old-fashioned policies such as capital controls and other government distortions have become part of the standard policy tool kit (so called macro- prudential policies). On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand of theoretical literature contends that capital controls are welfare enhancing and can be justified rigorously because of second-best considerations. Within the same theoretical framework adopted in this fast-growing literature, this paper shows that a credible commitment to support the exchange rate in crisis times always welfare-dominates prudential capital controls, as it can achieve unconstrained allocation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Inter-American Development Bank in its series IDB Publications with number 80682.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Financial Sector; IDB-WP-393;
Other versions of this item:
- Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric Young, 2013. "Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," Research Department Publications IDB-WP-393, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Eric Young & Alessandro Rebucci & Christopher Otrok, 2013. "Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective," 2013 Meeting Papers 641, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- F37 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Exchange rate commitment always beats capital controls
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2014-01-24 15:08:00
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