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On the Micro-Foundations of Contract versus Conflict with Implications for International Peace-Making

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  • Syed Mansoob Murshed
  • José A. Cuesta

Abstract

This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative model of civil conflict between a government and a rebel group.First, the papers model allows for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may affect each other. Second, the model allows for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary. Third, the paper allows for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups.Fourth, the paper expands external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers buying peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and why sub-optimal sanctions provision (cheap talk) by the international community are frequent.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank in its series IDB Publications with number 6748.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:6748

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Keywords: Public Utilities; WP-644;

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  1. repec:fth:oxesaf:2001-3 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-73, October.
  3. Frances Stewart, 2000. "Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 245-262.
  4. Jean-Paul Azam, 2001. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 38(4), pages 429-444, July.
  5. Tony Addison & S Mansoob Murshed, 2010. "From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract," Working Papers, eSocialSciences id:3206, eSocialSciences.
  6. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Development and Comp Systems, EconWPA 0409007, EconWPA.
  7. Tony Addison & Philippe Le Billon & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 11(3), pages 365-386, September.
  8. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2001. "Civil War and the Social Contract," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 124, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  9. Alberto Alesina & Sule Ozler & Nouriel Roubini & Phillip Swagel, 1992. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 4173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Patricia Justino, 2006. "On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know?," HiCN Working Papers, Households in Conflict Network 18, Households in Conflict Network.
  11. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  12. Edward Miguel & Shanker Satyanath & Ernest Sergenti, 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 725-753, August.
  13. Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
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