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Voter Preferences, Electoral Promises, and the Composition of Public Spending

Author

Listed:
  • Keefer, Philip
  • Scartascini, Carlos
  • Vlaicu, Razvan

Abstract

This paper proposes and empirically tests a new demand-side explanation for distortions in public spending composition. Voters prefer spending with certain and immediate benefits when they have low trust in electoral promises and high discount rates. The paper incorporates these characteristics of voter choices into a probabilistic voting model with public spending tradeoffs. In equilibrium, candidates promising larger allocations to transfers and short-term public goods are more likely to win elections in settings with low trust and high impatience. An original survey of individual-level preferences for public spending in seven Latin American capital cities provides observational and experimental evidence consistent with the model-derived hypotheses. Respondents reporting low trust in politician promises are more likely to prefer transfers to public goods; respondents with high discount rates prefer short-term to long-term spending. These patterns also appear in country-level data on spending outcomes from the last two decades.

Suggested Citation

  • Keefer, Philip & Scartascini, Carlos & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2020. "Voter Preferences, Electoral Promises, and the Composition of Public Spending," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 10450, Inter-American Development Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:10450
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0002434
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Leopoldo Fergusson & Carlos A. Molina & James A. Robinson, 2022. "The Weak State Trap," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(354), pages 293-331, April.
    2. Gilbert Nartea & Jacqueline Hernandez, 2020. "Government Size, the Composition of Public Spending and Economic Growth in Netherland," Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, Scientific Publishing Institute, vol. 9(2), pages 82-89.
    3. Bonvecchi, Alejandro & Calvo, Ernesto & Otálvaro-Ramírez, Susana & Scartascini, Carlos, 2022. "The Effect of a Crisis on Trust and Willingness to Reform: Evidence from Survey Panels in Argentina and Uruguay," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12359, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Alessandro, Martin & Cardinale Lagomarsino, Bruno & Scartascini, Carlos & Streb, Jorge & Torrealday, Jerónimo, 2021. "Transparency and Trust in Government. Evidence from a Survey Experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public investment; public goods; Trust; Spending composition; Voter preferences; Discounting; Transfers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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